The checkout flow or a third-party script is compromised
The attacker exploits a weakness in the site or in one of the third-party scripts it loads (a supplier compromise), gaining the ability to inject their own code into the checkout experience.
Gain the ability to alter what runs on the payment page.
- Subresource integrity and a strict content-security policy on payment pages
- Vetting and monitoring of third-party scripts; minimise them at checkout
- Use of a hosted/iframed payment field so card data never touches the page
- Unexpected changes to checkout page scripts or integrity failures
- New or modified third-party script sources
- CSP violation reports on payment pages
- Application test of the checkout flow and its script supply chain
- Review CSP, subresource integrity and payment-field isolation
- Validate change monitoring on payment pages
The attacker can influence what executes as customers enter card details.