Ransomware in the Financial services sector
How a ransomware attack could realistically chain together in a Financial services organisation, from initial access to business impact — and exactly what you should test to break the chain.
Exposed VPN to Active Directory ransomware
Weakly protected remote access is used to reach the internal network, escalate to domain-wide control of Active Directory, neutralise backups and stage ransomware across the estate.
Supplier account to internal network
A compromised supplier's access is used to enter the organisation through a trusted connection, then to move from the supplier's limited footprint toward internal systems and data.
Supplier software update to ransomware
A trusted software update from a compromised supplier delivers attacker code into the environment, which is used to establish control and deploy ransomware from the inside.
Why chaining matters here
A scanner might flag each weakness in this environment in isolation. What determines whether ransomware is actually achievable is whether those weaknesses — together with identities, trust relationships and gaps in monitoring — can be linked into a working path. That is what a red-team engagement validates, and what these chains are designed to help you scope.